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Abstract
This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-like en-
dogenous processes of jurisdiction formation in presence of a competi-
tive land market. In the model considered, a continuum of households
with di¤erent wealth levels and the same preferences for local public
goods, private spending and housing choose a location from a nite
set. Each location has an initial endowment of housing that is priced
competively and that belongs to absentee landlords. Each jurisdiction
is also endowed with a specic technology for producing public goods.
Households preferences are assumed to be homothetically separable
between local public goods on the one hand and private spending and
housing on the other. Public goods provision is nanced by a given, but
unspecied, mixture of (linear) wealth and housing taxes. We show that
stable jurisdiction structures are always segregated by wealth only if
households view any public good conditionally on the quantities of the
other public goods as either always a gross substitute, or either always
a gross complement, to private spending. We also show that, if there
are more than one public good, this condition is not su¢ cient for seg-
regation unless households preferences are additively separable. Since
this condition is necessary and su¢ cient for the segregation of stable
jurisdiction structures without land market and with only one public
good, our results suggests that introducing a land market does not
a¤ect the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation
but that increasing the number of public goods mitigates segregation.
Aix-Marseille Univ. & AMSE, Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2, rue de la Charité, 13
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1 Introduction
It is widely believed that endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation,
at least when driven by perfectly mobile households who make a Tiebout
(1956) trade-o¤ between local taxes and local public provision, are self-
sorting and segregative. That is to say, such processes lead to the formation
of homogenous jurisdictions inhabited by households with "similar" charac-
teristics. Gravel and Thoron (2007) investigates the validity of this belief
in the context of a classical model of endogenous jurisdiction formation due
to Westho¤ (1977). In this model, households with di¤erent wealth and
the same preference for local public spending and private spending choose
to locate in a nite set of possible places of residence. Households who
choose the same place form a jurisdiction that democratically decides of
local taxes (paid by households on their private wealth) and local public
spending. The analysis focuses on stable jurisdiction structures. These are
partitions of the set of households that is immune to individual deviations,
under the assumption that an individual move has no e¤ect on jurisdictions
wealth, tax rates and public spending. Gravel and Thoron (2007) identify a
condition on householdspreference - the GSC condition - that is necessary
and su¢ cient to ensure the wealth-segregation of any such stable jurisdic-
tion structure. As in Westho¤ (1977), the denition of "segregation" used by
Gravel and Thoron (2007) is that underlying the notion of consecutiveness
(see also Greenberg and Weber (1986)). It denes as "wealth-segregated"
any jurisdiction structure in which the richest household of a jurisdiction is,
weakly, poorer than the poorest household of any other jurisdiction with a
strictly larger per capita wealth. The GSC condition requires households to
consider local public spending to be either always a gross complement, or al-
ways a gross substitute, to the private good. In Biswas, Gravel, and Oddou
(2008), the necessity and su¢ ciency of the GSC condition for segregation
is also established for a generalized version of the model that allows for
the presence of a generalized-utilitarian redistributive central government,
under the additional assumption that households preferences are additively
separable. While the GSC condition is stringent, and may be violated even
by additively separable preferences, it is certainly not an outlandish condi-
tion. For this reason, Gravel and Thoron (2007) and Biswas, Gravel, and
Oddou (2008) results may be seen as providing support to the widespread
intuition that endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation à la Tiebout
are inherently segregative.
Yet these results are obtained in a model with only one public good and
without a dwelling market and where, as a result, households can reside for
free in the jurisdiction that o¤ers their favorite public good and tax pack-
age. This contrasts somewhat with actual processes of jurisdiction formation
in which households must consume housing in order to have access to the
public good and tax package available at a particular jurisdiction. Does the
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requirement for households to consume housing in order to benet from local
tax and public good package a¤ect the segregative properties of endogenous
processes of jurisdiction formation ? More specically, what are the con-
ditions - if any - that households preferences must satisfy in order for any
stable jurisdiction structure to be segregative when housing consumption is
required for living in a jurisdiction ? This is the main question examined in
this paper. Realism is only one reason for addressing that question. Another
motivation for identifying the conditions on households preferences that are
necessary and su¢ cient for the segregation of stable jurisdiction structure
in presence of housing markets is that those markets provide an easy way
of testing the conditions through hedonic methods (see e.g. Rosen (1974) or
Bartik (1987)).
Addressing this question requires of course a model of jurisdiction forma-
tion driven by households optimizing decisions with respect to local public
good and taxes under perfect mobility that incorporates housing consump-
tion. At least three approaches to this modeling have been proposed in the
literature.
The rst, explored notably by Rose-Ackerman (1979), Epple, Filimon,
and Romer (1984), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1993), assumes that hous-
ing, owned by absentee landlords, is a perfectly divisible good available in
(possibly) di¤erent quantities in a nite number of locations. Households
have preference for housing, local public spending and non-housing private
spending and must consume a positive amount of housing at most one place.
Purchase of housing is made on competitive markets that equalize local sup-
ply of housing with local demand. Households who choose to consume hous-
ing at the same location form a jurisdiction and choose by majority voting
a property tax rate which, when applied to the (before tax) market value
of local land, nances local public spending. An important issue discussed
in this literature is the di¢ culty of establishing existence of stable juris-
diction structures. Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984) and Epple, Filimon,
and Romer (1993) have provided conditions on householdspreferences that
are su¢ cient for the existence of stable jurisdiction structures. As shown
by these authors, the conditions also guarantee that the stable jurisdiction
structures will be "segregated" in the same (consecutive) sense than above.
Models that satisfy these assumptions have been the object of intensive em-
pirical research in the last ten years or so (see e.g. Epple and Platt (1998),
Epple and Sieg (1999), Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2001) and Epple, Peress,
and Sieg (2011)).
Another approach, explored by Denzau and Parks (1983), Greenberg
and Shitovitz (1988) and Konishi (1996) among others, considers a similar
setting than the previous stream but with the important di¤erence that local
public good provision is assumed to be nanced by wealth taxation. To that
extent, this setting is closer in spirit to that of Westho¤ to which it is easy
to compare. Another advantage of this setting is that it eases considerably
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the problem of existence of stable jurisdiction structures (see for instance
Konishi (1996) for a quite general existence theorem). On the other hand,
assuming the nancing of local public spending by wealth taxation is clearly
at odd with what is observed in most institutional settings that we are aware,
as property tax is by far the most widely use nancing device for local public
spending.
The third approach has been proposed by Nechyba (1997), and builds
on the (largely unpublished) work of Dunz (1985), Dunz (1986) and Dunz
(1989). It di¤ers from the two previous ones in that it assumes that housing
is an indivisible good that is available in various types in the various ju-
risdictions. In such a setting, Nechyba (1997) proves the existence of stable
jurisdiction structure under both wealth and dwelling taxation. He also pro-
vides conditions that are su¢ cient for the segregation of stable jurisdiction
structures.
In this paper, we stick to the perfectly divisible land (or housing) frame-
work but we consider a nancing scheme of local public good provision that
combines wealth and dwelling taxation. Moreover, we allow for the possi-
bility that jurisdictions produce several public goods rather than a single
one. Yet, we adopt a more general view than the one typically taken in the
literature with respect to the mechanism used by local jurisdictions to se-
lect public good provisions and taxes. Indeed, except for the linearity of the
taxation (on both housing and wealth) and the balancing of the local gov-
ernment budget, we do not make any assumption on the process by which
taxes and local public good are chosen. By contrast, much of the literature
assume that local taxes are chosen by some voting mechanism (e.g. tax rates
are the favorite ones of the median individual). It is actually this voting as-
sumption which, together with competitive pricing of lands, create problems
of existence of stable jurisdiction structures. By abstracting from the par-
ticular mechanism used by jurisdictions to decide upon local public good
provision and taxes, our analysis thus escapes from the di¢ culties raised by
possible inexistence of stable jurisdiction structures.
While the abstraction from the particular intra-jurisdiction collective
choice goes toward a generalization of the approach favoured in the lit-
erature, we conduct the analysis by making the (signicantly) simplifying
assumption that households preferences are homotheticaly separable in the
sense of Blackorby, Primont, and Russel (1979) (3.4.2) between local pub-
lic goods on the one hand and private spending (on housing and private
consumption) on the other. This assumption is admittedly restrictive. Yet,
it is not grossly inconsistent with the available empirical evidence (see for
instance Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2010)) that indicates that the budget
share devoted to housing is remarkably stable both across locations (who
di¤er in local public good provision) and across households (who di¤er in
their wealth).
In this framework, we show that the propensity of stable jurisdiction
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structures to lead to segregation is not a¤ected by the introduction of the
housing market. For we show that a suitable generalization of the GSC
condition remains necessary and su¢ cient for any stable jurisdiction to be
segregated if there is only one public good. While we interpret this result as
indicative of a somewhat robust connection between the GSC condition and
the segregative properties of endogenous jurisdiction formation, we empha-
size that the assumption of separable homotheticity is crucial for the result.
Moreover, our analysis also suggests that the GSC condition may not be suf-
cient for segregation if preferences are not additively separable and there
are more than one public goods. This suggests, somewhat intuitively, that
increasing the number of public goods by which jurisdictions can be dis-
tinguished may mitigate the segregative feature of endogenous jurisdiction
formation.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we
introduce the main notation and concepts. Section 3 provide the results for
housing taxation while section 4 show how the results extend to the case
with a welfarist central government. Section 5 provides some conclusion.
2 The model
As in the literature, we consider economies with a continuum of households
represented by the [0; 1] interval, and we denote by  the Lebesgue measure
dened over all (Lebesgue measurable) subsets of [0; 1]. For any Lebesgue
measurable subset S of [0; 1], we interpret (S) as the fraction of house-
holdsin the set S. An economy is made of the three following ingredients.
First, there is a wealth distribution modeled as a Lebesgue measurable,
increasing and bounded from above function ! : [0; 1]! R++ that associates
to every household i 2 [0; 1] its strictly positive private wealth !i. Limiting
attention to increasing functions is a convention according to which house-
holds are ordered by their wealth (i  i0 =) !i  !i0).
The second ingredient in the description of an economy is a specication
of the householdspreferences, taken to be the same for all households. These
preferences are dened over k local public goods (Z = (Z1; :::; Zk)), private
spending (x) and housing (h) and are represented by a twice di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave1 utility function U : Rk+2+ ! R.
We sometimes focus attention on some particular public good j. On such
occasions, we may nd convenient to write a particular bundle Z of public
goods as Z = (Zj ;Z j) where the bundle Z j of the k 1 other public goods
is dened by Z jh = Zh if h < j and Z jh = Zh+1 if h > 1. All preferences
that are considered in this paper are also assumed to satisfy the following
1A function f : A! R (where A is some convex subset of Rl) is strictly quasi-concave
if, for every a; b, x 2 A, with a 6= b and every  2]0; 1[, f(a)  f(x) and f(b)  f(x)
imply f(a+ (1  )b) > f(x).
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regularity condition with respect to the public goods.
Condition 1 (Regularity) If k  2, then, for any bundle (x; h) 2 R2+ of
private goods and any two bundles Z and Z0 2 Rk+ of public goods, there
exists a public good j 2 f1; :::; kg for which a quantity quantity Zj 2 R+
can be found for which U(Zj ;Z j ; x; h) = U(Z0; x; h).
This weak regularity condition, that applies only if there are more than
one public good, rules out the possibility for indi¤erence surfaces in the pub-
lic goods space (conditional on any bundle of private goods) to have "vertical
or horizontal" asymptotes in the interior of Rk+. If indi¤erence surfaces in
the public goods space have vertical or horizontal asymptotes, then these
asymptotes must be the axes of the plane. For instance, preference that
would generate indi¤erence curves in R2+ as in gure 1 below, are ruled out
by this condition:
Z1
Z2
Z'
Z
Figure 1
As mentioned above, we also assume that the households preferences
are homothetically separable, in the sense of Blackorby, Primont, and Russel
(1979) (3.4.2) between the k public goods on the one hand and the two
private goods on the other. This assumption amounts to say that, for all
Z 2 Rk+ and (x; h) 2 R2+ , U can be written as:
U(Z; x; h) = G(Z;(x; h)) (1)
for some twice continuously di¤erentiable increasing and strictly quasi-concave
function G : Rk+1+ ! R and some twice continuously di¤erentiable, increas-
ing and homogenous of degree 1 function  : R2+ ! R+. For proving the
su¢ ciency of the GSC condition when the number of public goods is larger
than 1, we shall assume that households preference are not only homo-
thetically separable but are also additively separable so that the function
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G of expression (??) can be written, for any Z 2 Rk+ and  2 R+, as
G(Z; ) = g(Z) +  () for some increasing and strictly quasi-concave func-
tion g : Rk+ ! R+. and some continuous and increasing function R+ ! R.
We denote by ZMj (p
Z ; px; ph; R), xM (pZ ; px; ph; R) and hM (pZ ; px; ph; R)
the households Marshallian demands for public good j (for j = 1; :::; k), pri-
vate consumption and housing (respectively) when the prices of local public
goods are pZ = (pZ1 ; :::; p
Z
k ), the prices of private spending and housing are
px and ph and when its income is R. These Marshallian demand functions
are the - unique under our assumptions - solution of the program:
max
Z;x;h
U(Z; x; h) subject to pZ :Z+ pxx+ phh  R (2)
and are di¤erentiable functions of their arguments (except, possibly, at the
boundary of Rk+2+ ).
We emphasize that we view Marshallian demand functions as a dual
way of representing households preference for the k + 2 goods rather than
as a behavioral description of households behavior. After all real households
rarely purchase local public goods on competitive markets. For any given
vector Z 2 Rk+ of public goods, we denote by V Z the conditional (upon Z)
indirect utility function dened, for any (px; ph; y) 2 R3+, by:
V Z(px; ph; y) = max
x;h
U(Z; x; h) subject to pxx+ phh  y (3)
This conditional indirect utility function plays an important role in the
analysis. It describes indeed the maximal utility achieved by a household
endowed with a (net of tax) wealth y=px (using private good as numéraire)
when living in a jurisdiction o¤ering quantities Z of the local public goods
and (net of tax) dwelling price ph=px. We denote by hZM and xZM the
conditional (upon Z) Marshallian demands of the two private goods that
solve program 3. Under our assumptions, these conditional Marshallian
demands are continuous functions of their three arguments that satisfy all
the usual properties of Marshallian demands.
We also note that, thanks to homothetic separability, it is possible to
describe program (2) by means of a two-step budgeting procedure (see e.g.
Blackorby, Primont, and Russel (1979), ch. 5).
The rst step of the procedure is described by the program:
max
(Z;)2Rk+1+
G(Z; ) s. t. pZ :Z+ E(px; ph)  R: (4)
where the function E : R2+ is dened by the dual program:
E(px; ph) = E(px; ph; ) = min
x;h
pxx+ phh s. t. (x; h)   (5)
As is well-known indeed the expenditure function associated to a homoge-
neous utility function is linear in utility. As is also well-known from standard
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microeconomic theory that E is continuous, homogeneous of degree 1, in-
creasing and concave. Hence, in this rst step, the household is depicted as
allocating its wealth R between the local public goods Z and the "utility
of private spending" (measured by  = (x; h)), taking as given the public
price vector pZ and the "aggregate" price pX = E(px; ph) > 0 of (the utility
of) private spending. We notice that the function E is also involved in the
denition of the conditional indirect utility function V Z dened in program
(3). Indeed, it is immediate to verify that V Z writes:
V Z(px; ph; R) = G(Z;
R
E(px; ph)
) (6)
Denote now by Z(pZ ; E(px; ph); R) and (pZ ; E(px; ph); R) the (unique
under our assumptions) solution to program (4). Denote also by e(pZ ; px; ph;; R)
the optimal expenditure on the "utility of private spending" that results from
the solution of program (4) and that is dened by:
e(pZ ; px; ph;; R) = E(px; ph)
(pZ ; E(px; ph); R) (7)
The second step of the procedure consists in solving the program :
max
x;h
(x; h) s. t. pxx+ phh  e(pZ ; px; ph;; R)) (8)
Denote by x(px; ph; e(pZ ; px; ph;; R)) and h(px; ph; e(pZ ; px; ph;; R)) the so-
lution of program (8). Thanks to the homotheticity of the (separable from
the public goods) preferences for private goods represented by the function
, we know from standard microeconomic theory that the functions x and
h so dened can be written as:
x(px; ph; y) = zx(px; ph)y
and
h(px; ph; y) = zh(px; ph)y
where, thanks to Roys identity, zx and zh can be written as
zh(px; ph) =
@E(px; ph)=@ph
E(px; ph)
(9)
and :
zx(px; ph) =
@E(px; ph)=@px
E(px; ph)
(10)
Moreover, one has
hZM (px; ph; y) = h
(px; ph; y)
and
xZM (px; ph; y) = h
(px; ph; y)
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for any bundle Z of local public goods (Marshallian demands of housing and
private spending are independent from public good provision). As a result
of theorem 5.8 in Blackorby, Primont, and Russel (1979), it follows that:
ZM (pZ ; px; ph; R) = Z
(pZ ;E(px; ph); R) (11)
xM (pZ ; px; ph; R) = zx(px; ph)e(pZ ; px; ph;; R) (12)
hM (pZ ; px; ph; R) = zh(px; ph)e(pZ ; px; ph;; R) (13)
These results will be used later on. We nally notice that this description
of the households preference is valid for any number of public goods what-
soever. As it turns out, a large part of the analysis deals with conditional
Marshallian demand functions which are denoted, for any public good j =
1; :::; k, and any given specication Z j = (Z1; :::; Zj 1; Zj+1; :::; Zk) 2 Rk 1+
of the quantities of the k  1 other public goods, by ZMj (Z j ; pZj ; px; ph; R),
xM (pZj ; px; ph; R) and h
M (Z j ; pZj ; px; ph; R). These conditional demands
are dened to be the (unique) solution of program (2) for the conditional
utility function UZ j : R3+ ! R dened, for any (Zj ,h; x) 2 R3+, by:
UZ j (Zj ; x; h) = U(Z1; ::; Zj 1; Zj ; :Zj 1; :::; Zk; x; h) (14)
It can be checked that the aforementioned properties of U , including ho-
mothetic separability, are also possessed by UZ j for any Z j 2 Rk 1+ . We
accordingly denote by GZ j the (conditional) specication of the function
G of expression (??) above when U is replaced by UZ j .
The last two elements of our description of an economy are a common -
nite set L of l locations available to households together with a specication,
for each location l 2 L, of the amount of land Ll 2 R++ exogenously assigned
to l, and, for each public good j = 1; :::; k, of a cost function C lj : R+ ! R+
of producing public good j at l. We assume that these cost functions satisfy
C lj(0) = 0 and are increasing at every location l and for every public good j.
Allowing the cost of producing a given public good to di¤er across locations
seems natural to us (it is more costly to provide a given access to a sand
beach in Paris than in Miami). We assume throughout that the endowments
of land belong to absentee landlords that play no role in the economy. We
denote by D the domain of all economies (!; U;L; fLl; C l1; :::; C lkgl2L) that
satisfy these assumptions and by DA the subset of D that made of economies
where households have additively separable preferences.
A jurisdiction structure for the economy (!; U;L; fLl; C l1; :::; C lkgl2L)
is a list (j; fpl; tlh; tlw;Zlgl2L) where :
 j : [0; 1]!
[
l2L
flgR++ is a Lebesgue measurable function that assigns
to each household i in [0; 1] a unique combination j(i) = (li; hli) of a
place of residence and a housing consumption at that place of residence
and, for every l 2 L:
9
 pl 2 R++ is the (before tax) housing price at location l.
 tlh 2 R++ is the housing tax rate prevailing at location l
 tlw 2 [0; 1] is the wealth tax rate prevailing at location l
 Zl 2 Rk+ is the bundle of local public goods available at location l.
For any such jurisdiction structure, and for any l 2 L, we denote by
jl = fi 2 [0; 1] : j(i) = (l; a) for some a > 0g. Hence jl is the (Lebesgue
measurable) set of all households who have chosen to locate at l in the con-
sidered jurisdiction structure. The possibility that (jl) = 0 (l is a "desert"
jurisdiction) is of course not ruled out. We restrict attention throughout to
feasible jurisdiction structures that satisfy the additional conditions that:Z
jl
hlii d  Ll and (15)
tlhp
l
Z
jl
hlii d+ t
l
w
Z
jl
!id 
kX
h=1
C lh(Z
l
h) (16)
at every location l. That is to say, feasible jurisdiction structures are such
that, at any location, aggregate housing consumption does not exceed the
total amount of land that is available there (15), and that tax revenues raised
are su¢ cient to cover the cost of providing the available bundle of public
goods (16). Notice that the later inequality, together with the assumption
that the cost functions are increasing and satisfy C lj(0) = 0, implies that the
only public good package Z l that can be observed in a "desert" jurisdiction
is Z l = 0l.
Given an economy (!;U;L; fLl; C l1; :::; C lkgl2L) and a jurisdiction struc-
ture (j; fpl; tlh; tlw;Zlgl2L) for this economy, we denote by H l =
R
jl
hlid and
$l =
R
jl
!id the aggregate consumption of land and wealth (respectively)
at location l.
We remark that our denition of jurisdiction structures is quite general
and covers several models of endogenous jurisdiction formation with a hous-
ing market examined in the literature. It covers in particular models like
Konishi (1996) where local public good provision is assumed to be nanced
by (linear) wealth taxation as well as models such as Rose-Ackerman (1979),
Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1993), Ep-
ple and Romer (1991), Epple and Platt (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999), Epple,
Romer, and Sieg (2001), Epple, Peress, and Sieg (2011)) in which local pub-
lic goods are nanced by dwelling (or property) tax only. We believe that
allowing for both types of taxation is consistent with what is observed in
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several real world institutional settings. For instance several states in the US
have "property tax relief" features that reduce the tax burden of specic cat-
egories of tax payers on the basis of their income. Similarly in France, many
households are exempt from the so-called "taxe dhabitation" (dwelling tax)
on the basis of their income.
We now turn to our denition of a stable jurisdiction structure, which
we formally state as follows.
Denition 1 A feasible jurisdiction structure (j; fpl; tlh; tlw;Zlgl2L) for the
economy (!;U;L; fLl; C l1; :::; C lkgl2L) is stable if, for every l 2 L such that
(jl) > 0, one has, for every i 2 jl, H l = Ll and U(Zl; !i(1  tlw)  pl(1 +
twh )h
l
i; h
l
i)  V Z
l0
(1; pl
0
(1 + tl
0
h); !i(1   tl
0
w)) for every l
0 2 L not necessarily
distinct from l.
In words, a feasible jurisdiction structure is stable if, in every jurisdic-
tion, land consumption is equal to land supply and the bundle of land and
private spending obtained by every household is considered, by this house-
hold, better than any bundle that it could a¤ord (given its wealth, dwelling
tax and land prices) either in its jurisdiction of residence or elsewhere.
We notice that our denition of stability does not assume any specic
mechanism for choosing local public good provision and tax rate. By con-
trast, much of the literature dealing with endogenous formation of juris-
dictions assumes that local jurisdiction choose their tax rate and/or public
good provision by some voting mechanism. It is well-known that combining
a voting mechanism with a competitive pricing of the land may raise serious
existence problem, that are exacerbated if voting concerns the housing tax
rate (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman (1979), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984),
Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1993), Epple and Romer (1991) and Epple and
Platt (1998)). These existence problems are alleviated here by avoiding the
requirement for the tax rate to be result of a voting procedure. For instance
the (grand) jurisdiction structure in which all households are put into one
jurisdiction will be stable if a Inadas condition on one of the public good
is assumed (as no household would want to unilaterally move to a desert
jurisdiction with zero public goods in that case, even if land is free).
We now investigate under which condition any stable jurisdiction struc-
ture is wealth-segregated. This requires a denition of wealth-segregation
that we provide as follows.
Denition 2 A feasible jurisdiction structure (j; fpl; tlh; tlw;Zlgl2L) for the
economy (!;U;L; fLl; C l1; :::; C lkgl2L) is wealth-segregated if, for every house-
holds h, i and k 2 [0; 1] such that !h < !i < !k, h 2 jl, k 2 jl and i 2 jl0
for some l0 6= l imply that V Zl(1; pl(1 + tlh); !h(1   tlw)) = V Z
l0
(1; pl
0
(1 +
tl
0
h); !h(1  tl
0
w)) for every h 2 jl [ jl
0
.
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In words, a jurisdiction structure is wealth-segregated if any jurisdiction
jl containing two households with strictly di¤erent levels of wealth also
contains any household with wealth in between of those two or, if it does
not contain this household, it is because it resides in another jurisdiction
jl
0
that is "identical" to jurisdiction jl in the sense that everybody living in
either of these jurisdiction is indi¤erent between the two.
In Gravel and Thoron (2007), in a model without housing and with one
public good, it was established that the Gross Substitutability/Complementarity
(GSC) condition according to which the (non-symmetric) relation of gross
substitutability or complementarity (as it may be) of the unique public good
vis-à-vis private consumption is independent from all prices is necessary and
su¢ cient for the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure. In
the current context where land is present and where there are, possibly,
many public goods, it turns out that the GSC condition applied to the con-
ditional Marshallian demand of every local public is necessary and su¢ cient
for securing the wealth-segregation - as per denition 2 - of any stable ju-
risdiction structure as per denition 1. This statement of this generalized
GSC condition is the following.
Condition 2 (Generalized GSC) The households preference satises the
generalized GSC condition if, for every local public good j, the function
ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; px; ph; R) is monotonic with respect to px for any (p
Z
j ; ph; R) 2
R3+.
We notice that, thanks to (11), one can write
ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; px; ph; R) = Z
Z j(pZj ;E
Z j(px; ph); R) (17)
where the functions ZZ j and EZ j are nothing else than the functions Z
and E dened for the utility function UZ j : Since the function E
Z j is in-
creasing in its two arguments, requiring the function ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; px; ph; R)
to be monotonic with respect to px is equivalent to requiring the function
ZZ j to be monotonic with respect to the aggregate private goods price
index pZ jX = E
Z j(px; ph).
Using this fact, we now establish that this generalization of the GSC
condition is necessary and su¢ cient for the wealth segregation of any stable
jurisdiction structure. As it turns out, this condition will not be su¢ cient
in the most general version of the model presented here. It will be su¢ cient
either if we make the additional assumption that there is only one local
public good, or that the households preferences are additively separable
between local public goods on the one hand and the private goods on the
other.
Yet, as established in the following proposition, the condition will be
necessary for segregation.
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Proposition 1 The GSC condition is necessary for the wealth segregation
of any stable jurisdiction structure for an economy (!;U;L; fLl; C l1; :::; C lkgl2L)
in D.
Proof. Suppose that the GSC condition is violated. This means that there
exists a public good j 2 f1; :::; kg, some private spending prices p0x; p1x and
p2x satisfying 0 < p
0
x < p
1
x < p
2
x for which one has:
ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
0
x; ph; R) = Z
M
j (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
2
x; ph; R) > Z
M
j (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
1
x; ph; R)
(18)
(the argument is similar if we assume instead ZMCj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
0
x; ph; R) =
ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
2
x; ph; R) < Z
M
j (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
1
x; ph; R)) for some public good j
price pZj 2 R++, housing price ph 2 R++, some vector Z j 2 Rk 1+ of quan-
tities of the other public goods and some income R > 0). Denote by Z1 and
Z2 the vector of public goods dened by:
Z1 = (ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
1
x; ph; R);Z j)
and:
Z2 = (ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
2
x; ph; R);Z j)
= (ZMj (Z j ; p
Z
j ; p
0
x; ph; R);Z j).
Using (17)) and homogeneity of degree 0 of Marshallian demands, expression
(18) can be written as:
Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ;
eE(p0x; ph); 1) = ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p2x; ph); 1) (19)
> Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ;
eE(p1x; ph); 1)
where:
qZj = p
Z
j =R andeE(pjx; ph) = EZ j(pjx; ph)=R for j = 0; 1; 2
Of course, since 0 < p0x < p
1
x < p
2
x and the function E
Z j is increasing with
respect to its arguments, one has 0 < eE(p0x; ph) < eE(p1x; ph) < eE(p1x; ph).
Let us show that we can nd an economy in D for which a stable jurisdiction
structure can be non-segregated. For this sake, consider the economy where
L = f1; 2g and where the wealth distribution function ! is such that there
are  and  2]0; 1[ satisfying  <  for which one has:
!i = 1= eE(p0x; ph) for all i 2 [0; [,
!i = 1= eE(p1x; ph)=R for all i 2 [; [ and,
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!i = 1= eE(p2x; ph)=R for all i 2 [; 1],
and let there be a mass t > 0 of household of type t (for t = 0; 1; 2) with
the masses chosen in such a way as to satisfy:
0!0 + 2!2 =
1
qZj
= 1!1 (20)
It is clearly possible to nd such positive real numbers t (for t = 0; 1; 2).
One simply set
1 =
1
!1qZj
> 0
and observe that there are several strictly positive values of 0 and 2 that
satisfy:
2 =
1
!2
(
1
qZj
  !00)
Consider any increasing and convex cost functions C lg (for g = 1; :::; k) and
l = 1; 2) such that
X
g 6=j
C1g (Zg) =
X
g 6=j
C1g (Zg) = c for some non-negative real
number c that we leave, for the moment, unspecied. Let also C1j = C
2
j = C
for some strictly increasing and convex cost function C satisfying:
C(Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ;
eE(p1x; ph); 1)) <
C(Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ;
eE(p0x; ph); 1)) = C(ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p2x; ph); 1))
< 0!0 + 2!2 (21)
= 1!1
Consider the jurisdiction structure (j; fpl; tlh; tlw;Zlgl=1;2) dened by:
j(i) = (2;zh(p0x; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p0x; ph;; 1)) for i 2 [0; [, (22)
j(i) = (1;zh(p1x; ph)eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1)) for i 2 [; [, (23)
j(i) = (2;zh(p2x; ph)eZ j(qZj ; p2x; ph;; 1)) for i 2 [; 1], (24)
p1(1 + t1h) = p
2(1 + t2h) = ph (25)
t1h = t
2
h = 0;
t2w = q
Z
j C(Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ; eE(p2x; ph); 1)) and (26)
and
t1w = q
Z
j C(Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ;
eE(p1x; ph); 1)) (27)
where the function eZ j is the analogue, for program 14, to the function e
dened in expression (7) for program (4). Observe that, thanks to (20) and
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(21), one has tlw 2 [0; 1] for l = 1; 2. Observe also that equation (25) leaves
complete freedom for choosing before-tax housing price and dwelling tax
rates pl and tlh satisfying p
l(1 + tlh) = ph for l = 1; 2. Set now the quantities
of land L1and L2 so that:.
1zh(p1x; ph)eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1) = L1 (28)
and:
0zh(p2x; ph)eZ j(qZj ; p2x; ph;; 1) + 2zh(p2x; ph)eZ j(qZj ; p2x; ph;; 1) = L2
(29)
There are clearly no di¢ culties in nding such L1 and L2. Given Ll, set the
yet undetermined positive real numbers tlh and p
l so that :
tlhp
l
hL
l = c
(for l = 1; 2). It is clear that this equality, which says that the cost of
producing the public goods other than j in the two jurisdiction is nanced
by housing taxation, requires to set tlh =
c
plhL
l for l = 1; 2. Substituting this
back into equation (25) yields:
pl = ph   c
Ll
for l = 1; 2. It is clear that the before tax housing price pl so dened will be
positive if the cost functions C lg (for g = 1; :::; k) and l = 1; 2) are chosen in
such a way that c is su¢ ciently small. Let us show that this non-segregated
jurisdiction structure is stable. Our choice of L1 and L2 already guarantees
(equations (28)-29) that land markets clear at the two locations. Since, as
was just established, the cost of producing public goods other than j in
the two jurisdiction is exactly covered by housing tax revenues, equations
(26)-(27) imply that the total tax raised in each of the two jurisdictions
covers exactly the cost of public good provision. We only need to show that
no household has incentive to modify its consumption of public good and
private goods either at its location or at the other. We provide the argument
for a household of type 1 living at jurisdiction 1, leaving to the reader the
task of verifying that the same argument holds for a type 0 and type 2
household living at jurisdiction 2 Consider therefore household 1 who has
private !1 = 1= eE(ptx; ph) and who lives at location 1 where it consumes
the bundle Z1 = (ZZ jj (q
Z
j ;
eE(p1x; ph); 1)); Z j) of public goods and has
!1(1  t1w) to spend on housing and private spending. Yet:
!1(1  t1w) = !1[1  qZj C(ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1))]
=
[1  qZj C(ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1))]eE(p1x; ph)
= Z j(qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1) (30)
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thanks to the budget constraint associated to the program 4 applied to the
conditional consumers program (14). Now, since a type 1 household con-
sumes zh(p1x; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1) units of housing (equation (22) pur-
chased at price ph, such a household has
!1(1  t1w)  phzh(p1x; ph)[eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1)]
available for private spending. Yet we know that
!t(1  t1w)  phzh(ptx; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1)
= Z j(qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1)  phzh(p1x; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1)
= ptxzx(p1x; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1)
Since (zh(p1x; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1);zx(p1x; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1)) solves
program (8), a type 1 - household can not nd a bundle of private spending
x and housing h satisfying phh + x  Z j(qZj ; E(p1x; ph); 1)) = !t(1   t1w)
that is strictly preferred to:
(zh(p1x; ph)(eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1); p1xzx(p1x; ph)[eZ j(qZj ; p1x; ph;; 1)]
Hence a type 1 household has no incentive to change its private consumption
pattern within its jurisdiction. It has also no incentive to move to location
2. Indeed, if it were to move there, it would obtain the bundle:
Z2 = (Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ;
eE(p0x; ph); 1)); Z j) = (ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p2x; ph); 1)); Z j)
for which it would pay t2w!1 amount of tax and would have !1(1  t2w) units
of numéraire to spend on private matters. Observe now that, thanks to (26)
and (30):
[t1w + (1  t1w)]!1 = C(ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1))=1 + Z j(qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1)
= [t2w + (1  t2w)]!1
= C(Z
Z j
j (q
Z
j ; eE(p2x; ph); 1))=1 + (1  t2w)]!1
Dene now the function eGZ j :R2+ ! R+. by:eGZ j (c; ) = GZ j (C 1(c); )
where C 1 is the inverse cost function. This function is well-dened if C is
strictly increasing. Since (C(ZZ jj (q
Z
j ;
eE(p1x; ph); 1)); Z j(qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1))
solves the program:
max
(Z;)2Rk+1+
GZ j (Zj ; ) s:t: Zj=1 +   !1:
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it follows from a standard revealed preference argument that
eGZ j (C(ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1)); Z j(qZj ; eE(p1x; ph); 1))
 eGZ j (ZZ jj (qZj ; eE(p2x; ph); 1))=1 + (1  t2w)]!1:
Hence type 1 household prefer staying in 1 than moving to 2.
We now turn to the question of the su¢ ciency of the GSC condition for
segregation. As in Gravel and Thoron (2007) or Westho¤ (1977), doing this
analysis requires some knowledge of the households preferences dened in the
space of all parameters that a¤ect its choice of place of residence, preferences
that are described, as mentioned earlier, by the conditional indirect utility
function dened in (3). Under homothetic separability, we know from (6)
that we can write this conditional indirect utility function V Z as:
V Z(1; qh; !i(1  t!)) = G(Z;!i(1  t!)bE(qh) )
where bE(qh) = E(1; qh). Suppose now that we focus on some public good j
and that we x the quantities Z
 j 2 Rk 1+ of the other k   1 public goods.
We can then represent a typical indi¤erence curve of a household of wealth
!i in the space [0; 1]R+ of all combinations of wealth tax rate and public
good j by means of the implicit function zI : [0; 1]! R dened by
GZ j(zI(t; !i);
!i(1  t)bE(qh) )  a (31)
for some a. Since GZ j is a twice di¤erentiable concave and strictly increas-
ing function of its two arguments, it is clear that the implicit function zI is
well-dened and twice di¤erentiable. Di¤erentiating (31) with respect to t
yields:
@zI(t; !i)=@t  !ibE(qh)GZ jZj
G
Z j

(32)
If we now di¤erentiate (32) with respect to !i, we obtain:
@2zI(t; !i)
@t@!i

G
Z j
Zj
G
Z j

  (1 t)!ibE(qh)[GZ j ]2 (G
Z j
 G
Z j
Zj
 GZ jZj G
Z j
 )
bE(qh)[GZ jZj
G
Z j

]2
(33)
Notice also that the Marhallian demand for public good j conditional upon
the quantities Z
 j
of the other k   1 public goods can be dened to be the
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solution of the following program:
max
Zj
GZ j(Zj ;
!i   pZZbE(qh) ) (34)
that is characterized (under our conditions) by the rst order condition:
G
Z j
Zj
G
Z j

 p
Z
jbE(qh) (35)
If we di¤erentiate identity (35) with respect to bE(qh) = pX , we obtain (upon
manipulations):
@ZZ j(pZj ; pX ; !i)
@pX

 G
Z j
bE(qh) [
G
Z j
Zj
G
Z j

  !i pZZZ j(:)bE(qh)[GZ j ]2 (G
Z j
 G
Z j
Zj
 GZ jZj G
Z j
 )]
G
Z j
ZjZj
  2p
Z
jbE(qh)GZ jZj + (p
Z
j )
2
[ bE(qh)]2GZ j
(36)
If the generalized GSC condition holds, the sign of the left hand side of
identity (36) is the same for all values of (pZj ; pX ; !i) and all quantities
Z
 j
of the other public goods. As the denominator of the right hand side
of (36) is negative thanks to the second order condition of program (34),
the sign of the right hand sign is completely determined by the sign of
G
Z j
Zj
G
Z j

  !i pZZZ j(:)bE(qh)[GZ j ]2 (G
Z j
 G
Z j
Zj
 GZ jZj G
Z j
 )] which must be constant under
the GSC condition. Because the sign of
G
Z j
Zj
G
Z j

  (1 t)!ibE(qh)[GZ j ]2 (G
Z j
 G
Z j
Zj
 
G
Z j
Zj
G
Z j
 ) is also what determines the change in the slope of indi¤erence
curves as given by (32) brought about by a change in the household wealth,
we therefore have that the slope of this implicit function evaluated at any
given (t; z) is monotonic with respect to !i. This monotonicity property,
which implies that any two indi¤erence curves belonging to households with
di¤erent wealth can cross at most once, will play a key role in the proof of
proposition 2 below. It is illustrated in gure 2 below.
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tax rate
public good
w0
w1
w2
Figure 2
Using this important single-crossing property, we now establish that, if
we restrict attention to economies in DA in which households have additively
separable preferences, or if we assume that there is only one local public
good, then the GSC condition is su¢ cient for the wealth segregation of any
stable jurisdiction structure.
.
Proposition 2 If households preferences satisfy the generalized GSC con-
dition, then any stable jurisdiction structure associated to an economy in
DA, or to an economy in D if k = 1, is wealth-segregated.
Proof. Consider rst any economy (!;U;L; fLl; C l1; :::; C lkgl2L) in DA and a
jurisdiction structure (j; fpl; tlh; tlw;Zlgl2L) for this economy and denote by
ql the after-tax dwelling price in jurisdiction l dened by ql = pl(1 + tlh).
Proceed by contraposition and assume that the jurisdiction structure is not
wealth-segregated. This means that there are households a; b and c in [0; 1]
endowed with private wealth !a < !b < !c, and 2 jurisdictions l and l0, with
a; c 2 jl and b 2 jl0 . Either this jurisdiction structure is not stable, and the
proof is over, or it is stable. If it is stable than one must have (exploiting
the additive separability of the preferences):
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!a)  g(Zl0) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  tl0!)!a) (37)
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!b)  g(Zl0) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  tl0!)!b) (38)
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!c)  g(Zl0) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  tl0!)!c) (39)
where for some continuous and increasing function   : R+ ! R with at least
one inequality being strict (to avoid universal indi¤erence). Suppose that
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ql  ql0 (the proof being symmetric if ql < ql0 . Since both the functions  
and bE are continuous and increasing, we know from the intermediate value
theorem that there exists some t! 2 [0; 1] such that  ( bE(ql)(1   tl!)) =
 ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)) It follows that:
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!a) = g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!a) (40)
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!b) = g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!b) (41)
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!c) = g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!c) (42)
Using the regularity condition on preferences, let Zj be the amount of
some public good j such that g(Zl
0
 j ; Zj) = g(Z
l). Hence one has:
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!a) = g(Zl0 j ; Zj) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!a)
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!b) = g(Zl0 j ; Zj) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!b)
g(Zl) +  ( bE(ql)(1  tl!)!c) = g(Zl0 j ; Zj) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!c)
and, as a result, inequalities (37)-(39) write:
g(Zl
0
 j ; Zj) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!a)  g(Zl0) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  tl0!)!a)(43)
g(Zl
0
 j ; Zj) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!b)  g(Zl0) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  tl0!)!b) (44)
g(Zl
0
 j ; Zj) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  t!)!c)  g(Zl0) +  ( bE(ql0)(1  tl0!)!c) (45)
which violates the single-crossing implication of the generalized GCS con-
dition in the plane of all housing tax rates and quantity of public good j.
We leave to the reader the task of verifying that the same argument can be
established under separability only if there is only one public good.
Additive separability (along with regularity) plays a key role in the proof
if the number of public good is larger than one. We further emphasize this
by providing an example of an economy in D (but not in DA) where a stable
jurisdiction structure can be non-segregated even when the GSC condition
holds. Hence, the GSC condition is not su¢ cient for segregation if there are
several public goods and if preferences are homothetically separable - but
not additively so:
Example 1 Consider and economy (!;U;L; fLlgl2L) in D where the house-
holds preferences are represented by the utility function:
U(Z1; Z2; x; h) = Z1 + Z2 ln(1 + 2(xh)
1
2 )
Such an utility function is continuous, increasing and strictly-quasi concave
with respect to all its arguments. Furthermore, the function is homothetically
separable - but not additively separable - between the 2 public goods on one
hand and the two private goods on the other hand. Consequently,using the
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two-step budgeting procedure, maximizing the utility function subject to the
budget constraint is equivalent to solving the program:
max
(Z1;Z2;)2R3+
Z1 + Z2 ln(1 + ) s. t. pZ1 Z1 + p
Z
2 Z2 + p  R (46)
where p = E(px; ph): For any amount Z2 of public good 2, the marshallian
demand for Z1 is given by:
ZMC1 (p
Z
1 ; p; R) =
R+ p
pZ1
  Z2 if R+ p
pZ1
> Z2
ZMC1 (p
Z
1 ; p; R) = 0 otherwise
which is always (weakly) increasing with respect to p. Even though it is
di¢ cult to provide an explicit denition of the marshallian demand for pub-
lic good 2 (equal to the conditional demand for that public good thanks to
additive separability between the two public goods), we can prove that it is
always decreasing with respect to p. Indeed, the Marshallian demand for
public good 2 conditional upon public good 1 is the solution of the following
program
max
Z2
Z2 ln(
p +R  pZ2 Z2
p
) (47)
and is characterized therefore by the 1st order condition:
ln(
p +R  pZ2 ZM2 (Z2; :)
p
)  p
Z
2 Z
M
2 (Z2; :)
p +R  pZ2 ZM2 (Z2; :)
 0
Di¤erentiating this identity with respect to p and rearranging yields:
@ZM2 (Z2; :)
@p
=
p
p+R pZ2 ZM2 (Z2;:)
[
R pZ2 ZM2 (Z2;:)
p2
] +
pZ2 Z
M
2 (Z2;:)
(p+R pZ2 ZM2 (Z2;:))2
]
 pZ2
p+R pZ2 ZM2 (Z2;:)
[2 + 1
(p+R pZ2 ZM2 (Z2;:)
]
 0
(48)
Hence, the Marshallian demand for public good 2 conditional on public good
1 is decreasing with respect to the price of the private good so that the gener-
alized GSC condition holds Let us construct a stable but yet non-segregated
jurisdiction. For this sake, consider a jurisdiction structure with jurisdic-
tions j1 and j2 where Z11 = 1=100, Z
1
2 = 2, p
1 = 1, t1h = 0 and t
1
! = 7=10,
and j2, by Z21 = 0, Z
2
2 = 1, p
2 = 1, t2h = 0, and t
2
! = 1=1000, and 3 types
of households a; b; c with !a = 0; 1, !b = 1 and !c = 10. Assume also that
C11 = C
1
2 = C
2
1 = C
2
2 = C with C(x) = x. Households of types a and c will
prefer to live in jurisdiction 1 while households of type b will be better-o¤ in
jurisdiction 2. Indeed, their utility would be (approximately ):
0.011 in j1 and 0.001 in j2 for households of type a,
0,535 in j1 and 0.693 in j2 for households of type b,
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2,783 inj1 and 2,397 in j2 for households of type c.
There is obviously no di¢ culty in nding land endowments and mass a, b
and c of these households such that 7c = 1=100+2 and
b
1000 = 1 and such
that that the demand of land by each of these households equals the available
amount of land at these land prices.
3 Conclusion
The main lesson of this paper holds in one sentence. If a continuum of house-
holds with di¤ering wealth but with the same regular and homothetically
additively separable preferences for local public goods, private spending and
housing are free to choose their favorite combination of dwelling tax rates,
wealth tax rates and local public good provision, then any stable jurisdic-
tion structure that results from such a free choice will involve perfect wealth
stratication of those households if and only if the households preferences
satises a generalization of the GSC condition of Gravel and Thoron (2007).
Yet, as illustrated by the example, the generalization of the GSC condition
is not su¢ cient to ensure the segregation of any stable jurisdiction struc-
ture if there is more than one public good if preferences are homothetically
separable, but not additively so. While we believe this main lesson to be of
some interest, it is clear that more work needs to be done to understand the
extent to which this GSC condition is necessary or su¢ cient for segregation
in the case where households preferences are not homothetically separable.
It would also be important to test whether the GSC condition is actually
veried by households who populate the jurisdictions of the real world. The
fact that we have provided such condition in a model with competitive land
market opens up the way for empirical testing using the housing market.
We plan to provide these empirical tests in our future work.
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